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[The press is filled with reports on the multiple
conflicts  erupting  in  the  China  seas:  territorial
conflicts,  resource  conflicts,  and  historical
conflicts. Rarely is there serious discussion of the
efforts  by  the  nations  of  the  world's  most
dynamic economic region to achieve amity and
cooperation  on  issues  of  mutual  interest.
Fisheries and the resources of the sea is one such
realm,  and  David  Rosenberg  explores  the
impressive  progress  among the  powers  of  the
region in  attempting to  regulate  fishing,  while
highlighting  the  continued  conflicts  and
difficulties in regulating fishing at a time of sharp
decline in catch. Japan Focus.]
One  of  the  major  under-reported  stories  of
China's regional diplomacy is the slow but steady
progress it  has made negotiating a network of
bilateral  agreements  with  Japan,  South  Korea,
and Vietnam to manage their  common fishery
resources.
For  centuries,  the  China  Seas  have  provided
abundant  fisheries  for  food  security  and
employment  opportunities  for  their  coastal
countries,  China,  Japan,  South  Korea,  and
Vietnam. Flushed all year round by several large
rivers, the flat and shallow seabeds of the Yellow
Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea
are among the world's most productive fishing
grounds. However, as coastal urban populations
have  grown  and  as  fishing  technology  has
improved, competition for the shared fish stocks
of  the China Seas has intensified considerably.
Fish catch rates  began to decline in the 1970's
with  sharper  declines  registered  in  the
mid-1980's.  With  bottom trawlers  coming  into
widespread use in the 1990's, many species are
now threatened with collapse.
Given the migratory pattern of many species and
the common pool nature of the China Seas, no
single  country  would  be  able  to  manage  or
conserve  their  common  migratory  fish  stocks.
Despite  historical  conflicts  and  territorial
disputes, the coastal countries of the China Seas
have good reason to negotiate to avoid a tragedy
of the commons in their common waters.
The  precipitating  factor  for  the  recent
negotiations  was  the  enactment  of  the  United
Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea
(UNCLOS)  in  1994.  UNCLOS  grants  coastal
states the right to declare sovereign rights and
resource  control  over  an  Exclusive  Economic
Zone  (EEZ)  up  to  200  nautical  miles  off  its
coastlines.  China,  Japan,  South  Korea,  and
Vietnam  all  quickly  ratified  UNCLOS  and
declared  their  respective  EEZ's.  In  the  case  of
countries bordering semi-enclosed seas such as
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South
China Sea, where EEZ claims overlap, UNCLOS
call for establishing joint resource management
areas and provides guidelines for doing so, even
where  conflicting  territorial  claims  are
unresolved.  Hence,  collective  action  became
imperative  to  avoid  a  collapse  of  regional
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fisheries.  UNCLOS  provided  a  framework  for
pursuing  collective  action  between  the  coastal
states.
China signed an agreement with Japan in 1997
for cooperative fisheries management in the East
China Sea; it took effect in 2000. The Sino-South
Korean  agreement  for  cooperative  fisheries
management  in  the  Yellow Sea  was  signed in
1998 and took effect in 2001. China signed two
agreements  with  Vietnam  on  f isheries
management  and  boundary  delineation  in  the
Beibu or Tonkin Gulf that took effect in 2004. The
Sino-Japanese  and  Sino-South  Korean
agreements  are  both  for  5  years;  the  Sino-
Vietnamese agreement is for 15 years [1].
The agreements address three key issues. First,
they reaffirm each country's exclusive rights over
fishery resources and fishing activities in its own
EEZ. Second, they establish general principles for
reciprocal  fishing  access  in  each  other's  EEZ.
Third,  the  agreements  create  a  cooperative
management  regime  for  their  shared  fishery
resources.
Each  agreement  established  a  Joint  Fishery
Committee (JFC), including representatives from
each country appointed by each government, as
well  as  several  commissioners.  Although  each
JFC has somewhat different scope and authority,
they all have several common functions, such as
research on the status of fisheries,  consultation
wi th  f i sh ing  indus t ry  in te res t s ,  and
recommendations  to  fisheries  management
authorities on access to fishing zones. They may
make recommendations on fishing quotas, types
of species to be caught, and other conditions for
fishing.
Each JFC establishes an area for  joint  fisheries
management  in  the common seas  between the
coastal  countries.  In  the  Beibu/Tonkin  Gulf,
China and Vietnam have designated a Common
Fishery  Zone,  and  Waters  in  Transitional
Arrangements.  (See  Map  1.)
Map 1. Delimitation Line and Joint Fishing Zones
in the Tonkin Gulf
Source: Thao, 2005, p. 26
In  the  East  China  Sea,  China  and Japan  have
designated a Provisional Waters Zone (PMZ). In
the  Yellow Sea,  China  and  South  Korea  have
designated Provisional Waters and the Waters in
Transitional  Arrangements.  (See  Map  2.)  The
"Waters  in  Transitional  Arrangements,"  located
on each side of the joint resource management
area, provide some flexibility for each country in
restricting fishing in formerly open waters. After
four  years,  each  country  has  to  phase  out  its
fishing activities in the Transitional Zone (TZ) of
the other country and gradually conform to the
coastal state's EEZ jurisdiction.
Map 2. Agreed Zones of Sino-Japan/Sino-Korean
Fisheries Agreements
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Source: Xue, 2004. p. 206
The  different  types  of  management  zones
represent an effort to preserve some traditional
fishing communities and to mitigate the impact
of  fishing  restrictions  necessary  to  achieve
sustainable  yields.  For  example,  in  addition to
the  Waters  in  Transitional  Arrangements
mentioned  above,  the  Sino-Vietnamese
agreement also includes a Buffer Zone for Small-
sized  Fishing  Boats.  Many  small-sized  fishing
boats  near  the  China-Vietnam  shoreline  have
limited  communications  and  navigation
equipment. Some are not even motorized. Illegal
en t r y  by  m i s t a k e  i s  i n ev i t a b l e  a nd
understandable. Hence, Chinese and Vietnamese
negotiators decided to establish this buffer zone
to avoid unnecessary disputes by unintentional
illegal entry.
The  JFC's  have  the  power  to  decide  on
conservation  and  management  measures,
including the allocation of fishing quotas and the
maintenance  of  fishing  order.  They  all  must
ensure that fisheries are not endangered through
over-exploitation.  Recommendations  and
decisions are made by consensus,  according to
the  agreement.  JFC meetings  are  held  at  least
once per year, with additional ad hoc meetings as
necessary.
The major work of each JFC is to determine each
year how many fishing vessels of each country to
permit in these joint resource management areas.
The JFC employs a "quantity control approach"
that quantifies the total allowable catch (TAC) of
several target species, the status of each resource,
the extent of traditional fishing activities, modern
fishing  methods  and  management,  and  then
derives  the  allowable  number  of  vessels.  For
example, in 2001, the Sino-Japanese JFC set the
maximum number for Chinese fishing vessels in
the Japanese EEZ as 900 with no more than 600
operating  at  the  same  time.  A  total  of  317
Japanese trawlers, purse seines, and hook fishing
vessels  were  licensed  to  enter  China's  EEZ.
Japanese fishermen were allowed to fish up to
78,000  tonnes  in  China's  EEZ  and  China  was
allowed 70,000 tonnes in Japan's EEZ. There were
20,612 fishing vessels allowed to operate in their
PMZ with a total allowable catch (TAC) of 2.136
million tones [2, p. 208].
Fishing vessels of one country need to apply for a
license to fish in the other country’s EEZ. They
have  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the  joint
fisheries agreement as well as the domestic laws
and regulations of that country. Any violation is
subject  to  legal  procedures  of  the  country
controlling the EEZ where the fishing takes place.
In the case of seizure or detention,  the fishing
vessels  and  crew  must  be  promptly  released
upon posting a bond or other form of security.
The biggest difference among the agreements is
that  the  Sino-Vietnamese  agreement  for  the
Beibu/Tonkin Gulf fisheries also incorporates a
permanent maritime boundary delimitation. By
contrast,  there  is  no  permanent  maritime
boundary agreement between China and Japan
or  between  South  Korea  and  China.  The
boundaries used in the latter two agreements are
provisional,  pending final  delimitation of  their
currently overlapping EEZ claims.
In  the  Sino-Japanese  and  Sino-South  Korean
agreements,  enforcement  in  the  joint  resource
management area is to be carried out by the flag
 APJ | JF 3 | 6 | 0
4
state of each fishing boat. In the Sino-Vietnamese
agreement,  enforcement  is  carried out  by each
coastal  s tate  within  i ts  EEZ  boundary
delimitation.
One  notable  feature  of  the  Sino-Korean
agreement is  that  it  provides for  joint  Chinese
and  Korean  monitors  on  patrol  vessels  in  a
Transitional Zone on each side of the Common
Fishery  Zone.  They  may  board  and  inspect
fishing vessels of both parties. The flag state of
each vessel is responsible for compliance with the
terms of the JFC regulations.
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement is the
first  one  in  East  Asia  that  establishes  a
cooperative  fisheries  management  program
within demarcated maritime zones. It has more
management  authority  than  the  other  two
agreements.  The  Joint  Fishery  Committee  for
Beibu/Tonkin  Gulf  is  the  only  JFC entitled  to
make  rules  and  regulations  for  the  Common
Fishery  Zone  to  enforce  these  limits.  It  is  a
permanent body with full operational authority,
including a dispute settlement mechanism [2].
The agreements adopted by China, Vietnam, and
South  Korea  will  greatly  diminish  their
traditional  fishing  grounds  and  reduce  their
fishing industry. China has started a program to
scrap 30,000 fishing boats  and relocate 300,000
fishermen by 2010. About one million households
have been seriously affected. Japan has set up a 6
billion yen fund to support its fishermen facing
unemployment because of the agreement [3, p.
195]. Each country has started to take the painful
steps  necessary  to  shrink  fishing  grounds,  cut
back fishing fleets, and recycle redundant labor
in order to conserve and manage a vital resource.
From a  resource  management  perspective,  the
main limitation of these agreements is that they
focus on managing fishing activity in designated
areas  that  only  comprise  part  of  the  fishery
ecosystem.  Unregulated  waters  still  exist  for
unrestricted  exploitation  of  fish  stocks.  For
example, the Sino-Japanese agreement provides a
Current  Fishing  Pattern  Zone  around  the
disputed  Diaoyu/Senkaku  Island  where
traditional  fishing  may  continue  unrestricted,
thereby avoiding the territorial dispute over the
ownership  of  the  island.  However,  many  fish
stocks  migrate  seasonally  from  the  adjacent
management zone in the East China Sea to these
unrestricted fishing waters.
The contracting parties have made an effort to
carry  out  periodical  joint  patrols  to  prevent
illegal  fishing.  They  have  also  conducted
monitoring,  surveillance  and control  of  fishing
vessels  including  boarding  and  inspection.
However, no workable enforcement mechanism
has  been  established,  except  for  the  joint
enforcement  arrangement  in  the  China-South
Korea  TZ's.  No  contact  points  have  been
established for the exchange of information about
violations,  or  a  joint  program  to  provide
information  to  fishermen  about  the  laws  and
regulations of contracting. Many fishermen find
it  difficult  to  accept  that  they  cannot  fish  in
waters where they have done so for years. Hence,
monitoring and enforcement efforts need to be
strengthened to improve the effectiveness of the
agreements [3, p. 196].
Another  limitation  is  that  the  JFC's  have  little
transparency or accountability. They make their
decisions  behind  closed  doors  with  no  public
participation or dispute settlement mechanisms
for redress of grievances. The JFC's generally do
not publish their deliberations or the data upon
which their decisions are based, or the results of
scientific findings. Hence, it  is difficult to fully
understand the rationale for the regulations.
Some important  issues  remain unresolved.  For
example,  South  Korea  does  not  recognize  the
Sino-Japanese  fisheries  management  regime.  It
contends that its own EEZ includes part of the
northern end of the East China Sea, and that it
was not consulted in the negotiation of the Sino-
Japanese agreement.  The migratory fish stocks,
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unaware  of  these  conflicting  boundary  claims,
are  vulnerable  to  South  Korean  fishermen  in
these contested waters.
Notwithstanding  these  limitations,  the
agreements are important pioneering efforts. This
is  the  first  maritime  boundary  delimitation
agreement  China  has  reached  with  any  of  its
coastal  neighbors.  It  is  the  second  maritime
demarcation for Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese
agreements,  in  particular,  are  models  for
cooperative  fisheries  conservation  and
management  [4,  p.  20].
The major significance of all these treaties is that
they were signed in accordance with UNCLOS
and based on two main objectives, namely, the
peaceful settlement of fishery disputes and the
establishment of a system for sustainable fishing
for the communities around the China Seas. They
are all the result of political compromise among
countries  with  strikingly  different  levels  of
economic  development,  domestic  political
systems,  and  foreign  policy  concerns.
Joint  fisheries  conservation  and  management
efforts  have  been  effective  in  some  areas,  for
example the North Pacific salmon fishery. They
have  been  notably  ineffective  in  others,  for
example, the North Atlantic cod fishery. There is
still a long way to go to fully achieve sustainable
fisheries in the China Seas. The efforts described
here may still be too little, too late to conserve the
remaining  fish  stocks.  However,  this  evolving
network of bilateral agreements for cooperative
fisheries resource management is a constructive
step in the right direction.
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